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I. INTRODUCTION


The public discussion recently arising concerning a potential deregulation of real estate brokerage activity in the Argentine Republic requires a technical clarification which, although it may appear obvious to those of us who work on a daily basis in the field of anti-money laundering prevention, may not be equally evident to certain political, business, or regulatory sectors.


It is one thing to deregulate an economic activity. It is something entirely different to dismantle ? even indirectly ? the minimum preventive oversight mechanisms that the modern State requires in order to prevent certain sectors of the economy from being used as vehicles for channeling illicit assets. The distinction is not minor. And, within the current Argentine context, neither is it merely academic.


The real estate market has historically constituted one of the principal mechanisms used to integrate illicitly sourced funds into the formal economic system. This is not an opinion. It is a conclusion sustained for decades by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), multilateral organizations, the financial intelligence units of virtually every developed country, and international criminological experience.


Accordingly, any reform intended to modify the economic functioning of the real estate sector should necessarily avoid generating ambiguous interpretations regarding the continuity of the preventive obligations applicable to those participating in such market.


Because the potential elimination of professional associations, licensing requirements, or corporate barriers does not alter the intrinsic AML/CFT/CPF risk associated with real estate activity. The risk continues to exist and will likely continue to exist so long as organized economic crime itself continues to exist.


For precisely that reason, this paper does not seek to philosophically challenge a potential process of economic liberalization of brokerage activity.


Its purpose is different and consists in issuing a preventive warning that an intelligent deregulation of the Argentine real estate market should never be confused with a deregulation of the anti-money laundering preventive system.


Because if the Argentine State were to confuse both dimensions, it would not only enter into contradiction with the international standards undertaken before FATF. It would also risk affecting the technical and institutional credibility of the entire national preventive framework.


And this would occur, paradoxically, at one of the few historical moments in which Argentina appears to have begun rebuilding a certain degree of technical consistency in matters of international compliance.

In recent weeks, several policy guidelines relating to a potential bill promoted by the National Executive Branch aimed at deregulating certain aspects of the Argentine real estate market have become public knowledge.


The versions circulated by various media outlets and industry participants suggest that the principal objective of the initiative would be to modify the current framework governing professional associations, licensing, and access to the practice of real estate brokerage, seeking to reduce regulatory barriers, entry costs, and corporate structures considered incompatible with a model of greater economic openness and competition.


Within that context, certain concerns and questions have begun to arise regarding the potential impact such initiative could have upon the Anti-Money Laundering, Counter-Terrorist Financing, and Counter-Proliferation Financing system (AML/CFT/CPF), particularly with respect to the obligations currently applicable to the real estate sector as a Reporting Entity before the Financial Information Unit (UIF).


The concern is far from minor. The real estate market has historically been regarded by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as one of the economic sectors most vulnerable to the channeling of illicit funds.


The use of real estate transactions to conceal, layer, and integrate assets derived from criminal activities has constituted a globally recognized issue for decades.


Precisely for that reason, both FATF Recommendations and the domestic preventive systems of virtually all developed countries include real estate operators within the universe of activities subject to special preventive obligations.


Within that framework, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the issue from a strictly technical and legal perspective, seeking to demonstrate that:






II. THE CURRENT CONTEXT OF THE DEREGULATION INITIATIVE


As of the date of preparation of this article, the final bill has not yet been formally submitted to the National Congress.


Nevertheless, the various journalistic publications and public statements made by government officials reveal certain general guidelines apparently shaping the initiative.


The various media references and public statements known thus far indicate that the overall spirit of the initiative would appear to be aimed toward a relaxation of access to the activity, a reduction of the historical corporate barriers existing within the sector, and greater competitive openness in the field of real estate intermediation. The political discourse accompanying such ideas appears closely linked to an economic conception seeking to reduce regulatory costs, simplify structures considered excessively rigid, and promote a more open, less bureaucratic, and potentially more accessible market dynamic for new operators.


However, even if such objectives may generate legitimate debate from institutional, professional, or economic perspectives, what is truly relevant from the standpoint of anti-money laundering prevention is the fact that none of the public references known to date contain indications aimed at dismantling or relaxing the preventive framework applicable to the real estate sector.


No references have been observed regarding any potential repeal of customer due diligence obligations, elimination of reporting duties, or ? much less ? exclusion of the real estate market from the universe of Reporting Entities established by Law No. 25,246. Quite the contrary, everything appears to indicate that the public debate remains strictly focused on the economic and professional organization of brokerage activity, without extending ? at least for now ? to the preventive architecture designed by anti-money laundering regulations.


Moreover, an analysis of the journalistic publications, interviews, and public commentary relating to the initiative reveals ? at least thus far ? no serious indication regarding the elimination of anti-money laundering controls, repeal of UIF obligations, exclusion of the real estate sector as a Reporting Entity, relaxation of due diligence obligations, elimination of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs), amendment of Law No. 25,246 and/or repeal of UIF Resolution 43/2024.


The public discussion appears to be focused exclusively on issues of economic and professional regulation. And this is reasonable, because one thing is to debate whether real estate brokerage should continue to be considered a licensed profession or instead an open economic activity, while something entirely different is to analyze whether those participating in real estate transactions should continue to remain subject to preventive obligations designed to prevent the use of the market for money laundering purposes.


Confusing both dimensions would lead to a serious conceptual error.


III. THE NATURE OF THE AML/CFT/CPF SYSTEM


One of the principal conceptual mistakes that frequently arises whenever certain economic sectors undergo liberalization or regulatory simplification processes consists of assuming that every economic deregulation necessarily implies an equivalent reduction of State oversight mechanisms. Such reasoning, however, entirely disregards the contemporary logic underlying modern anti-money laundering systems.


The AML/CFT/CPF regime was not conceived for the purpose of organizing professions, protecting corporate incumbencies, or administering licensing systems. Its historical, legal, and institutional purpose is far deeper: preserving the integrity of the economic and financial system against the risk of infiltration by assets derived from illicit activities.


From this perspective, the true governing axis of the preventive system has never been the existence of university degrees, professional associations, or corporate licenses. The axis has always focused upon the inherent risk associated with certain economic activities capable of being used as vehicles for channeling, concealing, or integrating illicit funds.


Precisely for this reason, the Argentine preventive system ? like virtually every system inspired by FATF international standards ? currently encompasses an enormous diversity of entities whose incorporation into the preventive framework does not depend whatsoever upon the existence of professional licensing.


Commercial companies, fiduciaries, developers, financial service providers, securities market operators, virtual asset platforms, and multiple business structures are subject daily to preventive obligations because the legislature understands that the activities they conduct present objective vulnerabilities to money laundering.


The logic is eminently functional.


The State does not supervise because professional association membership exists. It supervises because risk exists.


And precisely for that reason, FATF built the entire international preventive framework upon a functional logic based upon risky activities and not upon professional corporate structures. FATF Recommendation 22 itself imposes preventive obligations upon real estate agents ?when they participate in transactions for their clients involving the purchase and sale of real estate.?


The obligation therefore arises from professionally participating in risky real estate transactions. Not from belonging to a particular professional association, holding a specific license, or from the legal denomination each country adopts to organize the activity.


And within that logic, the real estate market has historically occupied a central role.


International experience has demonstrated for decades that real estate transactions constitute one of the preferred mechanisms used by criminal organizations to provide an appearance of legitimacy to illicit funds. The possibility of mobilizing high-value assets, structuring complex transactions, operating through intermediary entities, concealing beneficial owners, or manipulating valuations renders the real estate sector particularly sensitive from the standpoint of organized economic crime.


Accordingly, reducing the analysis to a mere discussion regarding whether brokerage activity should continue to constitute a licensed profession would imply ignoring the true core of the issue. Because the risk of money laundering does not disappear when a professional license disappears. The risk remains. And precisely for that reason, the preventive mechanisms designed to mitigate it remain ? or should remain ? in place.


IV. ARTICLE 20 OF LAW NO. 25,246 AND REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE


The current wording of Article 20, subsection 15, of Law No. 25,246 is particularly enlightening.


The statute establishes as Reporting Entities: ?Natural persons and/or legal entities, or other structures with or without legal personality, engaged in real estate brokerage activity.?


The conceptual breadth of such wording is not accidental. The legislature deliberately avoided restricting the scope of the statute to licensed brokers, members of professional associations, university-trained professionals, auctioneers, or other persons registered with corporate entities. Indeed, the text of the law focuses directly upon the economic activity being conducted. In other words, whoever conducts real estate brokerage activity falls within its scope.


Such legislative criterion is fully consistent with FATF logic, insofar as ? as already explained herein ? the preventive obligation arises from the risk associated with the activity itself, and not from the manner in which the State chooses to administratively organize professional licensing.

Accordingly, even under the hypothetical assumption that Congress were to completely eliminate broker licensing and/or professional association requirements, qualifying titles, or any of the current corporate restrictions, such circumstance would not, in and of itself, alter the Reporting Entity status established under Law No. 25,246. This is because the central element would remain intact: the habitual and professional conduct of real estate brokerage operations.


V. THE ROLE OF FATF AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS


The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has historically regarded the real estate sector as one of the principal non-financial activities vulnerable to money laundering.


Recommendations 22 and 23 expressly incorporate real estate agents within the universe of activities subject to special preventive obligations.


And this responds to a broadly recognized criminological reality, namely that the real estate market constitutes one of the mechanisms most frequently used globally to integrate illicit assets, justify unexplained increases in wealth, conceal beneficial owners, transform illicit proceeds into apparently legitimate assets, and channel funds derived from corruption, drug trafficking, tax evasion, human trafficking, and organized crime.


In Latin America, moreover, the real estate sector presents additional vulnerabilities arising from informal economies, intensive use of cash, deficient registration systems, complex fiduciary structures, and historical weaknesses regarding asset traceability.


Accordingly, any potential elimination of preventive controls applicable to real estate operators would be incompatible with FATF Recommendations, the international commitments undertaken by the Argentine Republic, mutual evaluation processes, and global transparency standards.


Again, the discussion regarding professional association membership does not alter such reality, because the money laundering risk persists regardless of the economic model selected to organize the market.


The strategic importance FATF assigns to the real estate sector is further evidenced by the fact that the organization itself issued a specific and autonomous guidance document exclusively dedicated to the real estate sector, updated in 2022 precisely due to the persistence and evolution of money laundering typologies associated with the real estate market.


Such Guidance expressly recognizes the use of complex corporate structures; concealment of beneficial ownership; valuation manipulation; the use of cash; fiduciary schemes; transnational structures; and multiple opacity mechanisms associated with real estate transactions.


Finally, it should be emphasized that FATF itself expressly requires from real estate agents:


? customer due diligence;

? beneficial ownership identification;

? monitoring;

? recordkeeping;

? suspicious transaction reporting;

? training;

? risk-based supervision; and

? effective sanctioning authority over real estate operators.


VI. THE EXPRESS INCORPORATION OF REAL ESTATE AGENTS AS DNFBPS WITHIN FATF/GAFILAT STANDARDS


There exists an additional technical and legal aspect that renders even more delicate any potential interpretation aimed at weakening the preventive framework applicable to Argentine real estate brokerage: real estate agents were not incorporated tangentially or incidentally into FATF international standards. They were incorporated expressly, deliberately, and repeatedly as one of the principal categories of Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNFBPs).


This arises with absolute clarity from GAFILAT?s own General Glossary, which specifically includes ?real estate agents? within the universe of DNFBPs subject to anti-money laundering obligations.


The same definition is reproduced in the ?Guidance Directed to the DNFBP Sector for the Construction of Risk Matrices in Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Matters? issued by GAFILAT in December 2022, where the regional body expressly highlights that real estate agents constitute ?one of the sectors with the greatest exposure to ML/TF risk.?


Likewise, the ?Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to the Real Estate Sector? published by FATF in July 2022 reaffirms that the real estate sector continues to constitute an international strategic priority in matters of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing.


Such Guidance is particularly forceful in clarifying that:


? preventive obligations apply to real estate agents;

? they also apply to other professionals participating in real estate transactions; and

? such obligations must be interpreted ?in relation to the activity in question and not by virtue of professions or specific titles.?


This clarification is legally transcendental for the current Argentine debate.


Because FATF itself expressly anticipates the very scenario currently under discussion in Argentina: the possibility that different countries may organize the exercise of real estate activity differently, without thereby altering the preventive obligations applicable to those who professionally participate in real estate purchase and sale transactions.


In other words, the international standard already contemplates the existence of different regulatory models for brokerage activity ? more open, more professionalized, more commercial, or more liberalized ? while making absolutely clear that AML/CFT obligations do not depend upon the name of the profession or the corporate system adopted, but rather upon the intrinsic risk associated with the economic activity being conducted.


Precisely for that reason, the FATF Guidance states that: ?countries should be guided by their understanding of where the risks associated with the real estate sector lie, and not by definitional terminology.?


From this perspective, any attempt to exclude Argentine real estate brokers from the universe of Reporting Entities solely as a consequence of a potential economic liberalization of brokerage activity would be openly incompatible with:


? FATF Recommendations 22 and 23;

? Recommendation 28 relating to supervision of DNFBPs;

? the risk-based approach established under Recommendation 1;

? the corresponding Interpretive Notes;

? the FATF/GAFILAT General Glossary; and

? FATF?s specific 2022 Guidance for the real estate sector.


Accordingly, this would not constitute a mere local interpretative discussion. It would constitute a direct contradiction with express, specific, and repeatedly reaffirmed international standards issued by the FATF/GAFILAT system itself.


VII. THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF REAL ESTATE RISK: DATA, TYPOLOGIES, AND COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE


The need to maintain real estate brokers within the universe of Reporting Entities is not grounded upon abstract prevention, but rather upon a verifiable economic reality. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that the global volume of laundered funds annually represents between 2% and 5% of world GDP, equivalent to approximately USD 800 billion to USD 2 trillion.


Within this global phenomenon, the real estate market occupies a particularly sensitive position due to the economic nature of the transactions involved: high-value assets, low transaction frequency, possibility of complex payment structures, use of corporations, trusts, nominees, concealed beneficial owners, manipulable valuations, and strong capacity for asset integration.


Comparative evidence confirms such vulnerability. According to information cited by Financial Crime Academy based upon Global Financial Integrity data, more than USD 2.3 billion was allegedly laundered through real estate transactions in the United States between 2015 and 2021. The same source identifies jurisdictions such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Germany as significant real estate laundering risk centers, with particular concentration in markets such as London, Toronto, Vancouver, and New York.


Likewise, with respect to Australia, it is reported that AUSTRAC estimated that, in 2020, Chinese interests allegedly laundered more than USD 1 billion through the Australian real estate market, and that the Australian Federal Police seized assets worth USD 187 million during fiscal year 2021, of which USD 116 million corresponded to assets linked to real estate-related activity.


These figures should not be viewed merely as isolated statistics from developed countries, but rather as a methodological warning for Argentina. If markets characterized by greater banking penetration, better registration systems, stronger asset traceability, and more robust supervisory structures continue to detect significant money laundering risks through real estate, then even greater caution is required in Latin American economies characterized by higher levels of informality, intensive cash usage, transactional dollarization, complex fiduciary structures, and historical weaknesses regarding beneficial ownership identification.


GAFILAT has been particularly clear in this regard. In its Guidance Directed to the DNFBP Sector for the Construction of Risk Matrices, it identifies real estate agents as one of the principal DNFBPs with the highest exposure to ML/TF risk and notes that, by 2021, more than 500,000 agents had been identified throughout the region.


That same Guidance warns that the participation of a real estate agent may provide a transaction with an appearance of legitimacy and normalcy, particularly in high-value transactions, thereby hindering the detection and investigation of money laundering activity.


Among the vulnerabilities specifically identified for the sector, GAFILAT mentions the absence of prudential regulation, difficulties in identifying beneficial owners, extensive use of cash transactions, lack of access to private due diligence tools, poor quality of AML/CFT controls, and insufficient preventive awareness among customers and operators.


With respect to red flags, the regional body identifies circumstances particularly relevant to the Argentine real estate market, including: customer refusal to provide documentation; economic profiles incompatible with the transaction; acting on behalf of third parties to conceal beneficial owners; payments originating from multiple sources; payments made by third parties; participation of foreign persons or structures; adverse media reports; links to officials investigated for corruption; multiple property acquisitions without apparent justification; and incompatibility between the declared transaction and the customer?s actual economic activity.


FATF, for its part, likewise identifies as critical indicators of real estate laundering: large cash transactions lacking reasonable explanation, participation of politically exposed persons or individuals linked to criminal activity, and complex structures designed to conceal the true ownership of property.


Accordingly, the elimination of preventive obligations applicable to real estate brokers would not constitute a mere market liberalization measure. It would mean removing from the system a privileged observation point situated at one of the most sensitive stages of the economic-criminal process: the moment in which illicit funds attempt to transform themselves into visible, stable, socially respectable, and legally registrable wealth.


VIII. THE FIDUCIARY SECTOR EXAMPLE


Perhaps one of the most illustrative examples for understanding the conceptual autonomy existing between professional regulation and preventive oversight may be found within the Argentine real estate ecosystem itself: the fiduciary sector.


Fiduciaries involved in real estate developments routinely manage structures of enormous economic and patrimonial complexity. They receive funds from multiple investors, manage assets of significant economic value, structure transactions involving diverse participants, and, in many cases, operate through particularly sophisticated legal vehicles. Nevertheless, despite the economic significance of the functions they perform, such operators are not necessarily subject to traditional professional association systems equivalent to those historically imposed upon brokers or auctioneers.


And yet, no one seriously disputes that they must comply with preventive obligations.

The reason is simple. The basis for the preventive obligation does not lie in membership within a professional association, but rather in the objective exposure to money laundering risk arising from the economic activity being conducted.


A fiduciary does not become a Reporting Entity because it possesses a license. It becomes a Reporting Entity because it manages structures potentially vulnerable to the channeling of illicit assets.


Exactly the same logic applies fully to real estate brokerage activity. Accordingly, even if the future Argentine economic framework were to move toward a model of greater openness and liberalization of real estate activity, this would not alter the essential fact that those who professionally and habitually participate in real estate transactions would continue operating within one of the sectors of greatest preventive sensitivity within the economic system.


And precisely for that reason, they would continue requiring minimum compliance structures capable of ensuring adequate customer identification, reasonable source-of-funds analysis, documentary traceability, customer profiling, customer segmentation according to assigned risk level, transaction monitoring, detection of unusual activity, suspicious transaction reporting, and record retention.


To argue otherwise would imply confusing economic freedom with absence of institutional responsibility. And such confusion, particularly in anti-money laundering matters, usually ends up generating extremely costly regulatory consequences for the countries that commit it.


IX. ECONOMIC DEREGULATION DOES NOT IMPLY ABSENCE OF CONTROL


One of the most frequent conceptual errors consists of interpreting economic deregulation as synonymous with absence of regulation, when in reality the concepts are not equivalent.


Modern economic liberalization processes implemented throughout different parts of the world do not imply the complete disappearance of State oversight. Rather, they generally involve the replacement of corporate barriers, reduction of access restrictions, elimination of regulatory privileges, in some cases administrative simplification, and the eventual strengthening of functional controls linked to the public interest.


Among such functional controls are, precisely, tax obligations, corporate oversight, financial traceability, anti-money laundering prevention, and economic transparency.


Accordingly, even under a broadly liberalized market framework, whoever engages in real estate brokerage activity would still need, in order to operate, to have a CUIT, to maintain tax registration, to demonstrate operational capacity, to comply with corporate regulations, to possess supporting documentation, to establish internal policies and procedures to prevent ML/TF/PF, and to comply with the applicable regulatory framework corresponding to the activity being conducted.


Far from disappearing, preventive obligations could even acquire greater relevance within a framework of economic deregulation of the activity. This is because a market with less corporate intervention will necessarily require greater mechanisms of State traceability and transparency.


X. THE CURRENT UIF POLICY AND THE ARGENTINE REGULATORY CONTEXT


Another relevant aspect for analyzing this issue is the recent institutional conduct of the Financial Information Unit.


Far from observing a trend aimed at relaxing the preventive system, during recent years the UIF has deepened processes of regulatory updating; modernization, updating, and increasing adjustment of its policies to FATF standards; technical strengthening; regulation for the digitalization of controls; improvement of information-exchange policies; electronic registration; risk-based supervision; and several aspects that demonstrate greater and increasingly evident alignment with international standards.


The recent resolutions issued by the UIF clearly demonstrate that the Argentine State continues to consider the AML/CFT/CPF system a strategic public policy. Particularly following the commitments undertaken before FATF in the most recent Evaluation Round conducted with respect to Argentina in 2024, FATF?s ongoing monitoring of the country, and the need to preserve institutional credibility.


Within that context, it would be extremely unlikely for the country to move toward the elimination of preventive controls precisely in one of the sectors historically regarded as most vulnerable to money laundering.


XI. THE RISKS OF A POTENTIAL REGULATORY CONFUSION


Although there currently exist no serious indications allowing one to assume an official intention to deregulate the AML/CFT/CPF system applicable to the real estate market, it is nevertheless important to issue a preventive warning.


Any legislative reform relating to real estate brokerage should carefully avoid generating interpretative gaps, regulatory overlap, regulatory contradictions, or doubts regarding the continuity of preventive obligations.


It will be particularly important to maintain coherence between future economic regulation and Law No. 25,246, to avoid ambiguous public messaging, to preserve compatibility with FATF standards, and to ensure that the UIF retains full supervisory authority over those conducting real estate activities, especially those engaging in real estate brokerage activity, whether such activity ? as a consequence of economic deregulation ? shifts from being a professional activity to an economic activity.


The market must clearly understand that any potential liberalization of access to the activity does not imply liberalization with respect to money laundering, since these are clearly entirely distinct regulatory dimensions.


XII. TOWARD AN OPEN MARKET MODEL WITH ROBUST PREVENTIVE CONTROLS


The current discussion could even represent an opportunity to comprehensively modernize the Argentine real estate market. It is entirely possible to construct a framework in which, on the one hand, greater competition, reduced regulatory costs, administrative simplification, digitalization, innovation, and economic freedom coexist and, at the same time, the maintenance and reaffirmation of requirements concerning asset traceability, robust anti-money laundering controls, risk-based supervision, economic transparency, tax compliance, and financial system integrity are preserved.

There is no contradiction between both objectives.


To the contrary. Modern and competitive markets require clear rules preventing their use by criminal structures.


Transparency does not constitute an obstacle to economic development. It constitutes a necessary condition for its sustainability.


XIII. INTERNATIONAL RISK, THE FOURTH ROUND OF MUTUAL EVALUATION, AND ARGENTINA?S POTENTIAL EXPOSURE


The potential elimination or weakening of the preventive regime applicable to real estate operators would not constitute merely an internal regulatory issue.


It could become a severe matter of international policy, institutional credibility, and economic stability for the Argentine Republic.


Particularly because the country has just undergone FATF?s Fourth Round of Mutual Evaluation, the evaluation process of which took place during 2024 and with respect to which Argentina currently remains under international observation, monitoring, and technical follow-up.


Within such context, any regulatory setback affecting one of the sectors historically regarded as most vulnerable to money laundering could be interpreted internationally as a deliberate weakening of the Argentine preventive system.


And this would entail potentially extremely serious consequences.


It must be remembered that the FATF system does not evaluate merely the formal existence of regulations. It fundamentally evaluates the effectiveness of the preventive system.


Accordingly, a State decision aimed at excluding precisely the real estate sector ? expressly identified by FATF as a high-risk DNFBP ? could generate severe questions regarding the level of technical compliance and effectiveness of the Argentine system.


It would also be particularly contradictory for the Argentine Republic to have developed, over the years, an integral process of regulatory alignment with FATF standards; to have voluntarily subjected its entire preventive system to international evaluation processes; to have prepared and approved a National Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment expressly following FATF methodology; to have formally identified, within such assessment, relevant vulnerabilities associated with the non-financial sector, intensive use of cash, economic informality, and the need to strengthen preventive controls over DNFBPs; and, simultaneously, to decide to exclude precisely one of the sectors historically identified by FATF itself as one of the principal high-risk Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions.


It should further be recalled that the 2022 National Risk Assessment itself specifically included 9,425 real estate agencies within the national preventive assessment, expressly treating them as relevant actors within the Argentine preventive system. This evidences that the Argentine State itself institutionally recognized the real estate sector as a relevant component within the national AML/CFT/CPF architecture.


A decision of such nature could therefore be interpreted internationally not merely as an internal economic reform, but rather as a true regulatory regression in one of the sectors historically most sensitive to money laundering worldwide.


The possible consequences of a significant deterioration in the international perception of the Argentine preventive system are not merely symbolic.


Historically, the inclusion of countries on FATF?s so-called ?Grey List? has generated:


? increased country risk;

? greater difficulty accessing international credit;

? increased financial costs;

? deterioration of correspondent banking relationships;

? heightened international scrutiny;

? reduced investment;

? indirect restrictions on access to the global financial system; and

? enhanced due diligence requirements regarding international transactions linked to the country.


Precisely for that reason, the Argentine AML/CFT/CPF system cannot be analyzed solely from a domestic logic of economic simplification or reduction of regulatory barriers.

The preventive system today constitutes an essential component of States? international financial credibility.


And within that context, deregulating real estate economic activity may constitute a legitimate discussion.


But dismantling ? directly or indirectly ? the preventive obligations applicable to the real estate sector could be interpreted internationally as a serious systemic regression.


Especially considering that FATF updated in 2022 its specific Guidance for the real estate sector, that the organization itself reaffirmed the need to strengthen controls over real estate agents, and that Argentina remains, as of today, under international monitoring following the Fourth Round of Mutual Evaluation.


XIV. THE NEED TO PRESERVE THE SYSTEMIC COHERENCE OF THE ARGENTINE PREVENTIVE MODEL


The issue addressed in this paper does not constitute an isolated or temporary debate.


To the contrary, it forms part of a broader doctrinal line related to the need to understand the Argentine anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing system as a true State policy, structured upon permanent international commitments, economic traceability requirements, and institutional credibility standards.


In prior works, the undersigned has already maintained that the Argentine preventive architecture cannot be analyzed exclusively from fiscal, administrative, or corporate perspectives, but rather as an integral component of an international financial governance framework whose stability depends upon the ability of States to preserve effective mechanisms of transparency, due diligence, and risk identification.


Particularly, several articles published by CASSAGNE Consultores have warned about the need to avoid erroneous interpretations that confuse economic simplification with preventive relaxation; about the continuity of due diligence obligations even within contexts of asset regularization or fiscal liberalization; about the importance of financial traceability as a central component of Argentina?s international credibility; and about the structural and permanent nature of the AML/CFT/CPF system as a transversal public policy of the Argentine State.


Within that same conceptual framework, this paper maintains that a potential economic deregulation of real estate brokerage cannot be interpreted ? either domestically or internationally ? as an implicit authorization to weaken the preventive controls applicable to the real estate sector.


Such interpretation would imply disregarding not only FATF and GAFILAT Recommendations, but also the doctrinal, regulatory, and institutional evolution that the Argentine Republic has developed in recent years in anti-money laundering matters.


In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, readers are invited to further explore these approaches in the doctrinal articles section published on the institutional website of CASSAGNE Consultores, relating to the Argentine AML/CFT/CPF system as a State policy, the regulatory challenges arising from asset disclosure and regularization processes, financial traceability, the systemic impact of FATF?s Grey List, and the need to strengthen risk-based preventive mechanisms within vulnerable sectors of the real economy.


XV. CONCLUSIONS


The potential deregulation of real estate brokerage currently under consideration in the Argentine Republic may be debatable, defensible, or criticizable from different economic, political, or corporate perspectives.


However, there exists one aspect which ? in the opinion of the undersigned ? should not form part of such discussion: the continuity of the AML/CFT/CPF preventive system applicable to the real estate market in general and to real estate brokerage activity in particular, regardless of whether such intermediation activity is considered a professional and licensed activity or a deregulated economic activity.


And this for one elementary reason. The problem of money laundering does not disappear because the State decides to liberalize access to an economic activity. In fact, under certain scenarios, it could even intensify.


A more open market, less corporate in nature and with fewer pre-existing access filters necessarily requires greater levels of traceability, monitoring, and transparency.


Precisely for that reason, interpreting a potential deregulation of brokerage activity as a signal of relaxation regarding UIF matters would constitute a technical error of enormous magnitude and one capable of generating severe consequences for Argentina within the framework of its international commitments.


FATF never built its standards upon the idea of professional association membership. It built them upon the notion of risk. And the risk inherent to the real estate market remains entirely intact regardless of the existence of licensing requirements to conduct brokerage activity, the need to belong to professional associations, or the economic model selected to organize the activity.


That is why Law No. 25,246 itself employs a broad and functional formula. It does not refer to licensed professionals. It simply refers to those who ?conduct real estate brokerage activity.? The conceptual distinction is transcendental.


Because it demonstrates that the Argentine legislature already understood that the true axis of the preventive system is not the corporate structure of the operator, but rather the risky economic activity being conducted.


And from that perspective, it is entirely possible ? and even reasonable ? to discuss greater economic openness within the real estate market without in any way affecting the due diligence obligations involving proper customer identification and knowledge, understanding of the product and the reasons for its selection, analysis of source of funds, transactional profiling of customers, segmentation of customers according to assigned risk level, monitoring of operations, detection and treatment of unusual activity, and the eventual filing of suspicious transaction reports before the UIF, together with all remaining preventive obligations.


Indeed, if the Argentine State intends to build a more competitive, dynamic, and modern real estate market, it will likely need to strengthen traceability and prevention mechanisms even further.


This is because efficient markets require transparency, and transparency requires intelligent controls ? not corporate controls designed to artificially restrict competition, but rather efficient State controls aimed at preventing the economic system in general and the real estate sector in particular from being used by criminal organizations, in this case for laundering purposes.


Excluding real estate brokers from the Argentine preventive system solely as a consequence of a potential economic deregulation of brokerage activity would imply disregarding not only the historical logic of the AML/CFT/CPF system, but also ignoring express, reiterated, and technically unequivocal recommendations issued by FATF and GAFILAT, organizations which have consistently identified the real estate sector and real estate agents as essential actors within the international preventive architecture against money laundering and terrorist financing. And doing so would constitute a severe setback for Argentina in its policy of alignment with FATF and the international community, potentially exposing the country to the serious consequences already detailed throughout this article.


The potential elimination of real estate brokers as Reporting Entities would also constitute a particularly delicate contradiction from an institutional standpoint, given that the Argentine State itself formally recognized in the 2022 National Risk Assessment the need to deepen and strengthen preventive controls over non-financial sectors vulnerable to money laundering, including the real estate sector.


The challenge, therefore, does not consist in choosing between economic freedom and anti-money laundering prevention. The true challenge consists in understanding that both may coexist and in achieving a modern regulatory framework that simultaneously allows and guarantees greater competition, less unnecessary economic bureaucracy, fewer corporate privileges, greater innovation, and increased digitalization, WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY ACHIEVING greater traceability, greater transparency, greater professionalization of compliance applied to sales and intermediation processes within the real estate sector, and stronger preventive capacity against organized economic crime.


Ultimately, the deregulation of real estate brokerage may eventually modify who may conduct the activity, but it cannot and MUST NOT modify a far more important issue: the obligation that those participating in the Argentine real estate market continue preventing such market from being used to launder illicit assets.


Because the day Argentina confuses economic deregulation with institutional dismantling, it will have begun traveling a path incompatible not only with international standards, but also with the very stability and credibility of its economic system, thereby complicating the lives of its citizens and the country?s access to credit, international programs, and international facilities necessary to guarantee Argentina?s path toward sustained growth and economic and institutional stability.


Miguel Cassagne

AML/CFT/CPF Specialist Consultant.

Former Argentine Financial Intelligence Unit agent

Main Partner at CASSAGNE Consultores.


REFERENCES


? FATF, Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach to the Real Estate Sector, July 2022.


? GAFILAT, Guidance Directed to the DNFBP Sector for the Construction of Risk Matrices in Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Matters, December 2022.


? GAFILAT, General Glossary.


? FATF/GAFILAT, Mutual Evaluation Report of the Argentine Republic, December 2024.


? United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Money Laundering Overview.


? Financial Crime Academy, Money Laundering Through Real Estate.


? Financial Crime Academy, The Alarming Reality: Statistics Revealing Real Estate Money Laundering.


? ComplyAdvantage, Real Estate Money Laundering.


? Miguel Cassagne, articles published by CASSAGNE Consultores regarding the AML/CFT system as State policy, traceability, fiscal innocence, ?mattress dollars,? FATF, and anti-money laundering prevention.


? Argentine Republic ? Ministry of Justice and Human Rights ? SAIJ/INFOJUS, National Risk Assessments on Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction ? Public Version 2022.


? National Strategy for the Prevention and Combat of Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Argentine Republic, 2022.