I. INTRODUCTION

The public debate recently sparked regarding a potential deregulation of real estate brokerage activity in the Argentine Republic requires a technical clarification which, although it may appear obvious to those of us who work daily in the field of anti-money laundering prevention, may not be equally evident to certain political, business, or regulatory sectors.

It is one thing to deregulate an economic activity. It is something entirely different to dismantle ? even indirectly ? the minimum preventive control mechanisms that a modern State requires in order to prevent certain sectors of the economy from being used as vehicles for channeling illicit assets. The distinction is not minor. And within the current Argentine context, it is not merely academic either.

Historically, the real estate market has constituted one of the principal mechanisms used to integrate illicitly sourced funds into the formal economic system. This is not an opinion. It is a conclusion sustained for decades by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), by multilateral organizations, by the financial intelligence units of virtually every developed country, and by international criminological experience.

Accordingly, any reform aimed at modifying the economic functioning of the real estate sector should necessarily avoid generating ambiguous interpretations regarding the continuity of the preventive obligations applicable to those operating within such market.

The possible elimination of professional associations, licensing systems, or corporate barriers does not alter the intrinsic AML/CFT/CPF risk posed by real estate activity. The risk continues to exist and will likely continue to exist as long as organized economic crime itself continues to exist.

For precisely that reason, this paper does not seek to philosophically challenge a potential process of economic liberalization of brokerage activity.

Its purpose is different. It seeks to provide a preventive warning that an intelligent deregulation of the Argentine real estate market should never be confused with a deregulation of the anti-money laundering preventive system.

Because if the Argentine State were to confuse both regulatory dimensions, it would not only enter into contradiction with the international standards assumed before the FATF, but would also risk affecting the technical and institutional credibility of the entire national preventive framework.

And this would occur, paradoxically, at one of the few historical moments in which Argentina appears to have begun rebuilding a certain degree of technical consistency regarding international compliance.

II. THE CURRENT CONTEXT OF THE DEREGULATION INITIATIVE

At the time of writing this article, the final legislative proposal has not yet been formally submitted to the National Congress.

Nevertheless, various press publications and public statements by government officials reveal certain general guidelines seemingly guiding the initiative.

The publicly known references suggest that the general spirit of the initiative is aimed toward facilitating access to the activity, reducing historically existing corporate barriers within the sector, and promoting greater competitive openness in the field of real estate intermediation.

The political discourse accompanying such ideas appears closely tied to an economic conception seeking to reduce regulatory costs, simplify excessively rigid structures, and encourage a more open, less bureaucratic, and potentially more accessible market dynamic for new operators.

However, even assuming such objectives may generate legitimate debates from institutional, professional, or economic perspectives, the truly relevant aspect from an anti-money laundering standpoint is that none of the public references known to date contain any indication whatsoever aimed at dismantling or relaxing the preventive framework applicable to the real estate sector.

There have been no references to eliminating due diligence obligations, removing reporting duties, or excluding the real estate sector from the category of Reporting Entities established under Law No. 25,246.

To the contrary, everything appears to indicate that the public discussion remains strictly focused on the economic and professional organization of brokerage activity, without extending ? at least for now ? to the preventive architecture established by anti-money laundering regulations.

III. THE NATURE OF THE AML/CFT/CPF SYSTEM

One of the principal conceptual errors that usually emerges whenever certain economic sectors undergo liberalization or regulatory simplification processes consists of assuming that every economic deregulation necessarily implies an equivalent reduction in State control mechanisms.

Such reasoning, however, completely ignores the contemporary logic of modern anti-money laundering systems.

The AML/CFT/CPF regime was not conceived to organize professions, protect corporate incumbencies, or administer licensing structures. Its historical, legal, and institutional purpose is much deeper: preserving the integrity of the economic and financial system against the risk of infiltration by assets derived from criminal activities.

From this perspective, the true governing principle of the preventive framework has never been the existence of university degrees, professional associations, or corporate licenses. The system has always focused on the inherent risk associated with certain economic activities capable of being used as vehicles for channeling, concealing, or integrating illicit funds.

For precisely that reason, the Argentine preventive system ? like virtually all systems inspired by FATF standards ? currently encompasses a wide variety of entities whose inclusion within the preventive universe does not depend in any way upon the existence of a professional license.

Commercial companies, fiduciaries, developers, financial service providers, securities market operators, virtual asset service providers, and numerous business structures are all subject to preventive obligations because lawmakers understand that the activities they conduct present objective vulnerabilities to money laundering.

The logic is eminently functional. The State does not supervise because licensing exists. It supervises because risk exists. And within that logic, the real estate market historically occupies a central place.

International experience has demonstrated for decades that real estate transactions constitute one of the preferred mechanisms used by criminal organizations to provide an appearance of legitimacy to illicitly sourced funds.

The possibility of mobilizing high-value assets, structuring complex transactions, operating through interposed entities, concealing beneficial ownership, or manipulating valuations makes the real estate sector particularly sensitive from the standpoint of organized economic crime.

IV. ARTICLE 20 OF LAW NO. 25,246 AND REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE

The current wording of Article 20, subsection 15, of Law No. 25,246 is particularly illustrative.

The statute establishes as Reporting Entities: ?Natural persons and/or legal entities, or other structures with or without legal personality, engaged in real estate brokerage activity.?

The conceptual breadth of such wording is not accidental. The legislature deliberately avoided limiting the scope of the provision exclusively to licensed brokers, members of professional associations, auctioneers, or other corporately registered individuals.

Indeed, the law focuses directly upon the economic activity being carried out. Whoever engages in real estate brokerage activity falls within the scope of the preventive regime.

Such legislative criterion is fully consistent with FATF logic, since the preventive obligation arises from the risk associated with the activity itself and not from the administrative manner in which the State decides to organize professional licensing.

Therefore, even under the hypothetical assumption that Congress were to completely eliminate licensing systems, professional associations, qualifying titles, or current corporate restrictions applicable to brokers, such circumstance would not, by itself, modify their status as Reporting Entities under Law No. 25,246.

This is because the central element would remain intact: the habitual and professional conduct of real estate brokerage operations.

V. THE ROLE OF FATF AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

The Financial Action Task Force has historically considered the real estate sector to be one of the principal non-financial activities vulnerable to money laundering.

Recommendations 22 and 23 expressly include real estate agents within the universe of activities subject to special preventive obligations.

This responds to a broadly recognized criminological reality: namely, that the real estate market constitutes one of the most commonly used mechanisms worldwide for integrating illicit assets, justifying unjustified increases in wealth, concealing beneficial ownership, transforming illicit money into apparently legitimate assets, and channeling funds derived from corruption, drug trafficking, tax evasion, human trafficking, and organized crime.

In Latin America, moreover, the real estate sector presents additional vulnerabilities derived from informal economies, intensive use of cash, deficient registration systems, complex fiduciary structures, and historical weaknesses in asset traceability.

Accordingly, any potential elimination of preventive controls applicable to real estate operators would be incompatible with FATF Recommendations, with the international commitments assumed by the Argentine Republic, with mutual evaluation processes, and with global transparency standards.

VI. ECONOMIC DEREGULATION DOES NOT IMPLY ABSENCE OF CONTROL

One of the most frequent conceptual mistakes consists of interpreting economic deregulation as synonymous with absence of regulation, when in reality such concepts are not equivalent.

Modern economic liberalization processes implemented throughout different parts of the world do not imply the total disappearance of State oversight. Rather, they generally involve replacing corporate barriers, reducing access restrictions, eliminating regulatory privileges, simplifying administrative structures, and simultaneously strengthening functional controls linked to the public interest.

Among such functional controls are tax obligations, corporate oversight, financial traceability, anti-money laundering obligations, and economic transparency requirements.

Therefore, even within a broadly liberalized market framework, anyone engaging in real estate brokerage activity would still require tax registration, operational capacity, supporting documentation, internal AML/CFT/CPF policies and procedures, and compliance with the entire regulatory framework applicable to the activity being conducted.

Far from disappearing, preventive obligations could even acquire greater relevance within a deregulated market environment, since a market with reduced corporate intervention necessarily requires stronger mechanisms of State traceability and transparency.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The potential deregulation of real estate brokerage currently under discussion in the Argentine Republic may be debatable, defensible, or criticizable from different economic, political, or corporate perspectives.

However, there exists one aspect which ? in the opinion of the undersigned ? should not form part of that debate: the continuity of the AML/CFT/CPF preventive framework applicable to the real estate market in general and to real estate brokerage activity in particular, regardless of whether such intermediation activity is considered a regulated profession or a deregulated economic activity.

And this for one elementary reason: the problem of money laundering does not disappear simply because the State decides to liberalize access to an economic activity.

In fact, under certain circumstances, such risk could even intensify.

A more open market, less corporately restricted and with fewer prior access filters, necessarily requires higher levels of traceability, monitoring, and transparency.

For precisely that reason, interpreting a potential deregulation of brokerage activity as a signal of relaxation regarding UIF obligations would constitute a technical mistake of enormous magnitude and one capable of generating serious consequences for Argentina within the framework of its international commitments.

FATF never built its standards upon the idea of professional licensing. It built them upon the concept of risk.

And the inherent risk associated with the real estate market remains entirely intact regardless of whether licensing systems, professional associations, or corporate organizational structures continue to exist.

That is why Law No. 25,246 itself adopts a broad and functional formula. It does not refer to licensed professionals. It simply refers to those who ?engage in real estate brokerage activity.?

The conceptual distinction is fundamental because it demonstrates that the Argentine legislature already understood that the true axis of the preventive system is not the corporate structure of the operator, but rather the risky economic activity being carried out.

Ultimately, the deregulation of real estate brokerage may eventually modify who is authorized to engage in the activity, but it cannot ? and MUST NOT ? modify a far more important issue: the obligation of those participating in the Argentine real estate market to continue preventing such market from being used to launder illicit assets.

Because the day Argentina confuses economic deregulation with institutional dismantling, it will have begun traveling a path incompatible not only with international standards, but also with the very stability and credibility of its own economic system.