By Miguel Cassagne

Head of CASSAGNE Consulting | AML Compliance

I. INTRODUCTION.

Over the past two decades, the international community has developed various mechanisms designed to prevent certain States, organizations, and individuals from gaining access to the financial resources, materials, and technologies necessary to develop weapons of mass destruction programs.

One of the most significant developments occurred in October 2006, when the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1718, establishing a sanctions regime against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) following its first nuclear test.

That same year, through Resolution 1737, the Security Council also imposed sanctions in connection with certain nuclear activities undertaken by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

These sanctions regimes evolved over time, incorporating restrictions on trade, financial transactions, and technology transfers, as well as mechanisms for freezing assets belonging to designated individuals and entities.

Nevertheless, international experience demonstrated that the adoption of sanctions alone was insufficient to prevent the various mechanisms employed by certain actors to acquire sensitive goods, finance proliferation programs, or circumvent established restrictions.

The use of intermediary companies, commercial intermediaries, international financial transactions, complex legal structures, and, more recently, virtual assets revealed that proliferation financing risks could extend into the economies of countries not directly involved in weapons of mass destruction development programs.

In June 2025, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) published a report specifically addressing complex proliferation financing and international sanctions evasion schemes, highlighting the increasing sophistication of certain operational methods.

Against this background, the Republic of Argentina also began progressively strengthening its legal and preventive framework. In September 2022, through Decree No. 652/2022, Argentina approved an updated National Risk Assessment of Terrorist Financing and the Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Subsequently, in March 2024, Law No. 27,739 introduced substantial reforms to the national Anti-Money Laundering, Counter-Terrorist Financing, and Counter-Proliferation Financing (AML/CFT/CPF) framework, expressly incorporating the criminal offenses of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and proliferation financing into Article 306 of the Argentine Criminal Code.

More recently, in January 2026, Argentina's Financial Intelligence Unit (Unidad de Información Financiera, UIF) issued Resolution No. 3/2026, establishing specific obligations concerning the identification of individuals and entities subject to United Nations Security Council sanctions, particularly those designated in connection with the proliferation programs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Islamic Republic of Iran (UN Security Council Resolutions 1718 and 1737), the reporting of suspicious transactions, and the administrative freezing of funds and other assets associated with proliferation financing.

As can be observed, this regulatory evolution is significant. Within only a few years, proliferation financing evolved from an issue primarily addressed through international commitments, strategic technology controls, and preventive regulations into one expressly covered by criminal offenses and specific administrative mechanisms within Argentina's AML/CFT/CPF framework.

Yet the matter does not end there. In October 2026, the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America (GAFILAT) published its first Regional Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment, examining the threats, vulnerabilities, and response capabilities of Latin American countries in relation to this phenomenon.

The report contains a particularly noteworthy finding: although it recognizes that Latin America is not among the regions most exposed to weapons of mass destruction proliferation risks, it also warns that this circumstance should not create a false sense of security.

The report explains that industrial activities involving dual-use goods, foreign trade transactions, maritime transportation, free trade zones, financial services, corporate structures, and virtual asset service providers may create vulnerabilities that can be exploited to facilitate financing arrangements or evade international sanctions.

This leads to a point I consider essential. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction does not necessarily begin with the manufacture of a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon. Under certain circumstances, it may begin much earlier, through the acquisition of an industrial component, the procurement of a logistics service, the transfer of financial resources, or the use of a corporate structure intended to conceal the ultimate beneficial owner of a transaction.

Accordingly, preventing proliferation financing requires an understanding of operational methods that may be carried out through entirely legitimate commercial activities.

This issue is particularly relevant to the Republic of Argentina, because our country had already identified certain proliferation financing vulnerabilities in its 2022 National Risk Assessment and, since then, legislative and regulatory changes have taken place that warrant examination in light of the findings of the recent regional assessment.

The purpose of this article is therefore to analyze the evolution of Argentina's legal framework, examine the principal findings of GAFILAT's October 2026 report, and consider how those findings could contribute to improving a future update of the National Risk Assessment and the preventive mechanisms applicable to reporting entities.

The purpose is not to suggest that Argentina faces a threat comparable to that of States directly involved in proliferation programs. Nor is it to advocate the indiscriminate imposition of additional administrative requirements. Rather, the objective is to determine how a preventive framework can be improved to identify risks whose exposure may be relatively limited but whose potential consequences and methods of execution justify appropriate technical treatment.

II. THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND ITS FINANCING: TWO DISTINCT CONCEPTS.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction generally encompasses certain activities related to the development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, supply, transfer, or expansion of capabilities involving nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as their delivery systems and related materials.

Proliferation financing, in turn, refers to the collection, provision, or use of financial resources intended to facilitate such activities, within the scope established by applicable criminal laws and international sanctions regimes.

This distinction is fundamental. A person who finances a proliferation-related activity does not necessarily participate directly in the manufacture or acquisition of the weaponry. That person's involvement may be limited to providing the resources necessary to enable such activities, using financial or commercial mechanisms that do not immediately reveal the intended purpose.

Furthermore, the resources involved may originate from entirely lawful sources. This represents an important distinction from the offense of money laundering, whose statutory elements involve property derived from criminal activity. In proliferation financing, by contrast, the lawful origin of funds is not necessarily sufficient to rule out prohibited conduct.

What matters is whether the objective and subjective elements required by the criminal offense, or the conditions established under the applicable targeted financial sanctions regimes, are satisfied.

Nevertheless, the criminal-law concept of proliferation financing must not be confused with the specific scope of proliferation financing risk defined under the FATF Recommendations.

For the purposes of that standard, FATF Recommendation 1 defines proliferation financing risk by reference to the potential breach, non-implementation, or evasion of targeted financial sanctions obligations under Recommendation 7.

This distinction is relevant because it makes it possible to differentiate between the broader phenomenon of proliferation, conduct criminalized under domestic law, and preventive obligations relating to international financial sanctions.

These concepts do not necessarily have the same legal scope.

III. INTERNATIONAL BACKGROUND: SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA AND IRAN.

International sanctions concerning North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs and certain Iranian nuclear activities constitute essential precedents for understanding the proliferation financing prevention framework.

In the case of North Korea, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) established restrictive measures that were subsequently expanded through additional Security Council resolutions. These measures include restrictions on certain goods and technologies, trade prohibitions, designations of individuals and entities, and mechanisms intended to prevent access to financial resources that could contribute to prohibited programs.

In the case of Iran, Resolution 1737 (2006) introduced sanctions relating to certain nuclear activities. The regime was subsequently modified in connection with the 2015 nuclear agreement and Resolution 2231. In September 2025, provisions of earlier sanctions resolutions were reinstated through the mechanism established under that resolution, although its implementation and legal validity were disputed by certain United Nations Member States.

These developments illustrate two distinct issues. First, targeted financial sanctions regimes constitute instruments of international law intended to restrict certain persons' and entities' access to funds and other assets. Second, their effective implementation requires financial institutions and other covered parties to maintain mechanisms for identifying designated individuals and entities, as well as relationships involving ownership, control, or actions undertaken on their behalf, to the extent covered by applicable provisions.

Accordingly, compliance cannot necessarily be limited to an exact name match. Under certain circumstances, it is necessary to examine whether assets are owned or controlled by a designated individual or entity, even where intermediaries or legal structures are involved.

Naturally, the existence of international sanctions must not be equated with a criminal conviction for a proliferation-related offense. These are different legal instruments, subject to distinct requirements and procedures. Nevertheless, both form part of the international framework intended to prevent and combat activities involving the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

IV. THE EVOLUTION OF ARGENTINE LAW: FROM PREVENTIVE CONTROLS TO EXPRESS CRIMINALIZATION.

Prior to 2024, the Republic of Argentina was already subject to international commitments and control mechanisms relating to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These included provisions concerning the peaceful use of nuclear energy, strategic export controls, sensitive materials, and dual-use technologies.

Nevertheless, the enactment of Law No. 27,739 represented a significant development in the criminal-law regulation of this phenomenon. Through Article 3, the law replaced Article 306 of the Argentine Criminal Code, expressly incorporating certain conduct involving the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and its financing.

1. The Criminal Offense of Proliferation Financing.

Article 306, paragraph 1, criminalizes the direct or indirect collection or provision of property or other assets from lawful or unlawful sources, with the intention that they be used, or with knowledge that they will be used, in whole or in part, for the purposes specified in the provision.

Subparagraph (f) expressly addresses the financing of activities related to nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, their delivery systems, means of delivery, related materials, and dual-use technologies and goods, within the scope and subject to the conditions established by the provision itself.

This offense is particularly significant because it does not necessarily require the resources to originate from prior criminal activity. As previously explained, the lawful origin of funds does not, in itself, preclude their use in financing conduct covered by the criminal provision.

2. The Criminal Offense of Proliferation.

The second paragraph inserted into Article 306 of the Criminal Code, immediately following subparagraph (f), criminalizes certain material acts involving the development, production, manufacture, possession, supply, export, import, storage, transportation, transfer, or use of the weapons covered by the provision, their delivery systems, and related materials intended for their preparation.

This is an offense distinct from proliferation financing because it encompasses conduct directly associated with the material proliferation of such weapons.

Both offenses are addressed under Article 306, which generally provides for imprisonment of five to fifteen years and a fine ranging from two to ten times the amount of the transaction, without prejudice to the specific rules established in that provision.

The breadth of the statutory verbs employed by the legislature makes strict adherence to the principle of legality in criminal law particularly important. Accordingly, not every activity involving nuclear, chemical, or biological technology constitutes criminal proliferation. Nor does the commercialization of dual-use goods automatically amount to prohibited conduct. Criminal liability requires that all statutory elements be established.

3. Reform of the Preventive Framework.

Law No. 27,739 also amended Law No. 25,246, expressly including proliferation financing within the objectives of the national preventive framework.

These amendments strengthened the UIF's powers and expanded the regulatory framework applicable to reporting entities in matters involving AML/CFT/CPF. The reform therefore represented an advancement in both criminal law and preventive regulation.

Nevertheless, specific operational procedures were still needed to implement obligations relating to targeted financial sanctions. This matter was subsequently addressed through UIF Resolution No. 3/2026.

V. UIF RESOLUTION NO. 3/2026: THE INTRODUCTION OF SPECIFIC TARGETED FINANCIAL SANCTIONS CONTROLS.

UIF Resolution No. 3/2026, issued on January 7, 2026, and published in the Official Gazette the following day, constitutes one of Argentina's most directly relevant regulatory developments in the prevention of proliferation financing.

The resolution establishes specific mechanisms for reporting suspicious transactions and implementing administrative freezes of funds or other assets in the circumstances contemplated by its provisions.

Among other matters, it expressly addresses designations under the international sanctions regimes established by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1737 (2006), concerning North Korea and Iran, respectively, together with subsequent and applicable resolutions.

1. Periodic Screening Against International Sanctions Lists.

Article 2, paragraph 3, of UIF Resolution No. 3/2026 requires reporting entities to conduct regular and periodic screening against lists of individuals and entities subject to targeted financial sanctions relating to proliferation financing. This obligation is particularly relevant within customer identification and due diligence procedures.

Until then, a substantial portion of the preventive mechanisms for identifying sanctioned persons had, in practice, been associated with screening against the Public Registry of Persons and Entities Linked to Acts of Terrorism and Their Financing (Registro Público de Personas y Entidades Vinculadas a Actos de Terrorismo y su Financiamiento, RePET) and other lists relating to terrorism and terrorist financing.

UIF Resolution No. 3/2026 also requires consideration of the specific sanctions lists relating to proliferation financing.

2. Suspicious Transaction Reporting.

The resolution also requires reporting to the UIF of completed or attempted transactions in which the circumstances specified in Article 2 are present. Article 3 further provides that proliferation financing suspicious transaction reports must be submitted without delay, within a maximum period of twenty-four hours calculated from the completed or attempted transaction.

3. Administrative Freezing of Assets.

Article 4 governs the obligation to immediately freeze funds or other assets covered by the circumstances established in the resolution, within the scope specified therein.

These measures operate in conjunction with the UIF's statutory powers and the applicable legal review mechanisms.

The significance of the resolution therefore extends beyond the introduction of an additional sanctions-screening requirement. It also establishes procedures for responding to certain transactions or relationships involving individuals and entities subject to targeted financial sanctions.

4. Relationship to International Developments.

UIF Resolution No. 3/2026 illustrates how certain obligations arising from the international sanctions framework are incorporated into Argentina's preventive mechanisms.

The international sanctions regimes concerning North Korea and Iran cease to be merely matters of international law and acquire concrete operational consequences for reporting entities.

Nevertheless, the resolution was issued before GAFILAT published its October 2026 regional report. It therefore must not be presented as a consequence of that report. Although the two documents concern related developments, they address different matters. The Argentine resolution establishes operational prevention and asset-freezing mechanisms, whereas the regional report examines the threats and vulnerabilities that may undermine their effectiveness.

This is precisely where the principal connection between the two instruments lies.

VI. GAFILAT'S FIRST REGIONAL PROLIFERATION FINANCING RISK ASSESSMENT: SIGNIFICANCE AND SCOPE.

In October 2026, GAFILAT published its first Regional Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment.

The report was prepared using information provided by sixteen jurisdictions, mutual evaluation reports, international documents, consultations with national delegations, and regional training and technical information-sharing activities.

Its principal objective was to identify vulnerabilities across different economic sectors, assess national response capabilities, and formulate recommendations aimed at strengthening preventive mechanisms.

The report also offered a particularly valuable perspective by recognizing that proliferation financing is not limited to transactions conducted by financial institutions.

On the contrary, it acknowledges that mechanisms for acquiring sensitive goods and evading sanctions may involve a diverse chain of economic activities. These may include manufacturers, exporters, customs agents, port operators, trust and company service providers, professionals, precious metals dealers, and virtual asset service providers.

Identifying these sectors does not imply a general presumption of wrongdoing. Rather, it recognizes that certain operational characteristics may create vulnerabilities that must be understood and, where appropriate, mitigated.

1. A Region With Comparatively Low to Moderate Exposure.

One of the report's most significant findings is that Latin America is not among the regions most exposed internationally to proliferation-related activities.

Nevertheless, GAFILAT warns that this does not mean that the risks are nonexistent. The region participates in international trade networks, has industries involving dual-use goods, maintains port facilities and free trade zones, and exhibits varying levels of development in its supervisory mechanisms.

Consequently, certain transactions could exploit regional infrastructure to channel goods or resources intended for prohibited activities.

2. The False Sense of Security.

The report cautions that a widespread perception of low risk may create a false sense of security. The absence of detected suspicious transactions or specific investigations does not necessarily establish that vulnerabilities are nonexistent. It may also reflect limited awareness of the phenomenon, inadequate training, or deficiencies in detection capabilities.

This distinction is important: genuinely limited exposure must not be confused with an inability to detect relevant transactions. Conversely, the mere absence of reports does not justify presuming that illicit activities are occurring.

Risk assessments must seek to distinguish between these situations through objective information and analysis.

3. Disparities Between Legal Frameworks and Their Effective Implementation.

GAFILAT identifies progress in legal frameworks governing targeted financial sanctions, while also recognizing significant differences in their implementation.

One of the report's principal findings is that the formal existence of legal provisions does not necessarily guarantee their effective implementation. Difficulties in coordination, insufficient supervisory capabilities, and limitations in identifying complex sanctions-evasion arrangements may persist.

Accordingly, the report recommends strengthening the practical application of existing mechanisms and improving institutional detection capabilities.

VII. THE MULTI-SECTORAL ANALYSIS: PRINCIPAL REGIONAL VULNERABILITIES.

One of the most valuable contributions of the regional assessment is its analysis of potentially exposed economic sectors.

1. Financial Institutions.

Financial institutions play a central role because of their involvement in international transfers, payments, trade finance, and the provision of services to companies participating in complex commercial transactions.

The report recognizes that this sector has relatively high exposure, but also benefits from more developed preventive mechanisms.

Its principal challenge may arise when identifying transactions involving sensitive goods and technologies where commercial documentation does not clearly establish their destination or ultimate end user.

GAFILAT acknowledges that financial institutions should not be expected to possess specialized technical expertise regarding every category of dual-use goods.

What is reasonable is for such institutions to maintain appropriate customer due diligence procedures, transaction analysis mechanisms, and arrangements for consulting competent authorities.

2. Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.

Trade in dual-use goods presents vulnerabilities arising from their potential use in both legitimate civilian activities and prohibited programs.

The report emphasizes the need to identify transactions that may facilitate the diversion of sensitive goods and to strengthen controls over their export, transit, and re-export.

The objective is not to indiscriminately restrict trade in technological products. Rather, it is to prevent seemingly legitimate transactions from being used to conceal prohibited destinations or purposes.

3. Maritime Industry.

Maritime and inland waterway transportation represents another relevant sector, as transit, transshipment, and re-export operations may complicate efforts to reconstruct particular commercial supply chains.

The report examines risks involving commercial documentation, vessel identification, the use of intermediaries, and the characteristics of shipping routes.

4. Free Trade Zones.

Free trade zones perform important functions in international commerce but may present specific challenges relating to supervision and traceability.

GAFILAT emphasizes the importance of strengthening controls over operators, goods, and transactions involving sensitive merchandise.

5. Trust and Company Service Providers.

Corporate and trust structures may legitimately be used to conduct business activities, administer assets, and organize investments. Nevertheless, certain structures may facilitate the concealment of beneficial owners or create a formal separation between purchasers and the true recipients of transactions.

Accordingly, the report examines risks associated with trust and company service providers and the need for appropriate mechanisms to identify beneficial owners.

6. Lawyers, Notaries, and Accountants

Professionals involved in certain corporate, asset-related, or commercial transactions may face specific vulnerabilities.

The existence of such risks does not mean that every professional activity must be indiscriminately subject to preventive obligations. Rather, the applicable requirements must reflect the activities actually covered by national regulations and the specific characteristics of the transactions involved.

7. Precious Metals and Precious Stones.

The report also examines the use of certain high-value goods that may facilitate the transfer or storage of wealth. Its analysis focuses on vulnerabilities involving the identification of market participants, traceability, and differences in supervision across jurisdictions.

8. Virtual Asset Service Providers.

Finally, GAFILAT examines the risks associated with virtual asset service providers (VASPs), noting that cross-border value-transfer mechanisms and certain traceability challenges may be exploited to facilitate transactions intended to evade sanctions.

In this regard, the report emphasizes the need to strengthen sectoral supervision and improve risk identification and management mechanisms.

VIII. ARGENTINA'S 2022 NATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT: PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED RISKS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO GAFILAT'S 2026 REGIONAL REPORT.

Through Decree No. 652/2022, the Republic of Argentina approved an updated National Risk Assessment of Terrorist Financing and the Financing of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

This document constitutes a particularly important precedent for analyzing the regional findings published by GAFILAT four years later.

Indeed, the Argentine assessment had already identified certain proliferation financing vulnerabilities, even though it considered the country's exposure to the principal international threats to be relatively limited.

1. Assessment of Threats.

The National Risk Assessment concluded that Argentina's proliferation financing threats fell at the lower end of the low-risk range. The assigned score was one point on the methodological scale employed.

The report explained this assessment by reference to several factors, including existing national controls over sensitive materials, limited trade exposure to the principal States identified, and the absence of known cases of proliferation financing networks engaging in criminal activities within Argentina, according to the sources considered when the assessment was prepared.

Nevertheless, this finding did not mean that the risk was nonexistent. On the contrary, the document itself recognized that significant vulnerabilities could remain.

2. Identified Vulnerabilities.

The Argentine assessment examined various vulnerabilities associated with proliferation financing. These included deficiencies in the targeted financial sanctions legal framework, limited specialized knowledge of the phenomenon among certain public authorities and private-sector participants, challenges in identifying beneficial owners, weaknesses in border controls and international trade, and vulnerabilities relating to virtual assets.

The report assigned a consolidated vulnerability score of 6.95 points, placing it within the medium-high range.

This finding deserves particular attention because it demonstrates that, even where identified threats were relatively limited, Argentina's preventive framework still exhibited vulnerabilities capable of undermining its effectiveness.

3. Overall Risk Assessment.

The National Risk Assessment employed a methodology that weighted threats and vulnerabilities to determine an overall risk score. The resulting score was 4.57 points, placing it near the upper boundary of the medium-low range.

This result illustrates an important conceptual distinction. Low exposure to threats does not necessarily imply that institutional or operational vulnerabilities are also low. On the contrary, limited threats may coexist with significant weaknesses in identification, prevention, and response mechanisms.

4. The Principal Regulatory Deficiency Identified in 2022.

One of the most significant aspects of the National Risk Assessment was its identification of the absence of a targeted financial sanctions regime specifically addressing proliferation financing.

The document noted that Argentina did not, at that time, have administrative mechanisms equivalent to those applicable to terrorist financing for identifying and freezing certain assets associated with proliferation.

It also highlighted the need to strengthen private-sector obligations relating to the identification, assessment, and mitigation of these risks.

This observation becomes particularly significant when examining subsequent regulatory developments.

Indeed, the reforms introduced by Law No. 27,739 and UIF Resolution No. 3/2026 demonstrate concrete progress in addressing those legal and regulatory deficiencies.

Nevertheless, the enactment of regulations does not automatically demonstrate their practical effectiveness. Determining the extent to which the identified vulnerabilities have been remedied would require an examination of their implementation, supervision, and outcomes.

5. Areas of Convergence With GAFILAT's 2026 Regional Risk Assessment

A comparison of the two documents reveals significant areas of convergence.

Argentina's 2022 assessment had already identified challenges involving corporate structures, beneficial ownership, international trade, virtual assets, and specialized knowledge of proliferation financing risks.

The 2026 regional report revisits many of these issues, but examines them from a broader, comparative, and multi-sectoral perspective.

It provides specific analyses of financial institutions, dual-use goods, the maritime industry, free trade zones, trust and company service providers, professionals, precious metals, and virtual assets.

It also provides a collection of red flags and recommendations that may prove useful in improving national assessment methodologies.

Accordingly, GAFILAT's regional report should not be regarded as wholly disconnected from Argentina's earlier national assessment.

Rather, it may serve as a reference for reviewing which vulnerabilities were previously identified, what measures have since been adopted, and which areas require further technical updates.

IX. THE NEED TO UPDATE ARGENTINA'S NATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT.

Argentina's 2022 National Risk Assessment constitutes an important precedent, but it should not be regarded as an immutable diagnosis.

Decree No. 331/2019 establishes a mechanism for the periodic review of national risk assessments.

Furthermore, since the assessment's 2022 cutoff date, legislative and regulatory developments and international events have occurred that warrant reconsideration of the continuing relevance of its findings.

These include the reforms introduced by Law No. 27,739, the issuance of UIF Resolution No. 3/2026, the evolution of international sanctions-evasion mechanisms, and the publication of GAFILAT's regional report.

The value of a new assessment would not lie merely in reiterating previously identified risk factors. Rather, it should make it possible to determine whether legal, regulatory, and operational developments have effectively altered the national vulnerabilities previously identified.

It could also incorporate the typologies and red flags developed in the regional report, taking into account their relevance to the structure of Argentina's economy.

In particular, it would be reasonable to examine beneficial ownership identification mechanisms, coordination between financial and foreign trade authorities, the capacity to detect transactions involving dual-use goods, and risks associated with certain virtual asset services.

Similarly, it would be necessary to assess the extent to which the procedures established by UIF Resolution No. 3/2026 have been effectively incorporated into the preventive compliance systems of each reporting entity listed under Article 20 of Law No. 25,246.

Naturally, the existence of new controls does not necessarily mean that residual risk should be considered low. Such a conclusion requires information concerning their effective implementation.

Accordingly, the regional assessment may constitute a valuable technical reference for a future update of Argentina's National Risk Assessment, without replacing the need to examine the country's specific circumstances.

X. IMPLICATIONS FOR ARGENTINE REPORTING ENTITIES.

The publication of GAFILAT's report raises a practical question: Should Argentine reporting entities modify their risk assessments, risk matrices, and due diligence procedures as a consequence of this new regional assessment?

The answer requires distinguishing between existing legal and regulatory obligations and the use of technical documents to improve compliance with those obligations.

GAFILAT's report does not, in itself, constitute a new UIF resolution. Nor does it automatically establish additional obligations applicable to all Argentine reporting entities. Nevertheless, its findings may be used to review the risk factors considered by each organization, within the scope of applicable requirements and in light of the characteristics of its activities.

Exposure to proliferation financing is not necessarily equivalent across all sectors. A financial institution regularly involved in international trade finance transactions may face vulnerabilities different from those affecting a real estate business engaged exclusively in domestic transactions.

Similarly, the risks associated with a company trading in sensitive industrial technology do not necessarily coincide with those affecting an organization providing professional services limited to activities with lower exposure.

Accordingly, any update should adhere to the risk-based approach.

The indiscriminate incorporation of additional indicators does not guarantee greater preventive effectiveness. On the contrary, an excessively complex risk matrix that bears little relationship to an entity's actual activities may hinder the identification of genuinely relevant circumstances.

In this context, GAFILAT's regional assessment may constitute a useful technical source for reviewing methodologies, but it should not be used as automatic justification for imposing disproportionate controls.

XI. FROM FORMAL COMPLIANCE TO EFFECTIVE PREVENTION.

The evolution of Argentina's preventive framework reveals significant progress: (a) the 2022 National Risk Assessment identified threats and vulnerabilities associated with proliferation financing; (b) Law No. 27,739 expressly incorporated the relevant criminal offenses and strengthened the preventive framework; (c) UIF Resolution No. 3/2026 established specific reporting, sanctions-screening, and asset-freezing procedures; and (d) GAFILAT's October 2026 regional report provides a new technical framework for understanding sector-specific vulnerabilities and international sanctions-evasion mechanisms.

Nevertheless, the central challenge is to determine the extent to which these instruments translate into effective preventive capabilities.

The existence of legal provisions does not, in itself, guarantee that all risks can be adequately identified. Nor does formal compliance with a procedure necessarily demonstrate that an organization understands the methods employed to circumvent international sanctions.

In this regard, one of the regional report's most important lessons is the need to strengthen interagency coordination.

Proliferation financing may simultaneously involve financial transactions, commercial activities, exports of sensitive goods, international transportation, and corporate structures.

None of the authorities involved in these areas necessarily possesses all the information required to reconstruct complex transactions.

Accordingly, cooperation among financial authorities, customs authorities, port authorities, foreign trade agencies, and supervisory bodies is essential.

The effectiveness of the preventive framework should not be measured solely by the number of regulations enacted or controls imposed. It should also be assessed on the basis of its actual capacity to identify risk situations, act promptly, and prevent financial resources from being used to facilitate prohibited activities.

XII. CONCLUSIONS.

The publication of GAFILAT's first Regional Proliferation Financing Risk Assessment constitutes an important development for Latin American preventive frameworks.

Its principal contribution is not to demonstrate that Latin America faces a widespread or imminent threat involving the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. On the contrary, the report recognizes that the region's exposure is comparatively low to moderate.

Nevertheless, it also warns that this circumstance should not create a false sense of security, since the use of commercial intermediaries, corporate structures, international financial transactions, dual-use goods, and virtual assets may generate vulnerabilities that can be exploited by actors seeking to finance proliferation-related activities or evade international sanctions.

The experience of the sanctions regimes concerning North Korea and Iran demonstrates the importance of maintaining appropriate mechanisms to identify designated individuals and entities and prevent financial resources from being made available to them.

In the Republic of Argentina, recent regulatory developments reflect significant progress. The approval of the 2022 National Risk Assessment, the express criminalization of proliferation and its financing through Law No. 27,739, and the issuance of UIF Resolution No. 3/2026 constitute concrete milestones in that process.

The relationship between the 2022 National Risk Assessment and subsequent regulations is particularly significant. That assessment had identified the absence of a specific targeted financial sanctions regime relating to proliferation financing as one of the principal vulnerabilities.

The 2024 legislative reform and the 2026 regulations demonstrate a legal and regulatory evolution aimed at addressing that deficiency. Nevertheless, the existence of new legal mechanisms does not automatically establish their effective implementation.

It is precisely for this reason that GAFILAT's regional report provides an opportunity to examine the evolution of Argentina's preventive framework and consider the need to update its risk assessment methodologies.

Moreover, comparing the two documents demonstrates that certain vulnerabilities identified at the regional level in 2026 had already been recognized by Argentina four years earlier.

Consequently, the challenge is not exclusively to incorporate new concepts into the preventive framework. Rather, it is to determine which previously identified vulnerabilities have been effectively mitigated and which continue to require additional measures.

In this context, a future update of the National Risk Assessment could benefit from GAFILAT's multi-sectoral analysis, typologies, and red flags.

Naturally, such an update should take into account the specific characteristics of Argentina's economy and avoid automatically applying regional findings that do not reflect the country's particular exposure.

The same principle applies to reporting entities. Preventing proliferation financing should not become an indiscriminate accumulation of documentary requirements. It must be governed by reasonableness, proportionality, and an effective understanding of the relevant risks.

In my view, one of the report's principal lessons is that low exposure to a threat does not necessarily mean that vulnerabilities within the preventive framework are also low. Argentina's 2022 assessment illustrates this distinction: while the threats were considered very limited, vulnerabilities received a significantly higher rating.

This distinction explains why it is necessary to periodically assess not only the existence of threats but also the institutional and operational capabilities intended to prevent them.

Ultimately, the central challenge is to move from the formal existence of controls to their effective implementation. Preventing proliferation financing does not mean presuming that every financial, commercial, or technological transaction constitutes suspicious activity.

Rather, it means understanding how certain legitimate mechanisms may be exploited to facilitate prohibited activities and establishing reasonable measures to prevent such misuse.

That is, perhaps, the principal lesson arising from GAFILAT's first Regional Risk Assessment for the next stage in the development of Argentina's anti-money laundering, counter-terrorist financing, and counter-proliferation financing framework.

November 2026