By Miguel Cassagne
Head of CASSAGNE Consulting
Chapter 1: Introduction ? The New Conflict Between Liquidity and Legality
The relationship between economic policy and regulatory compliance in the Argentine Republic has historically followed a pendulum dynamic. In times of crisis?when fiscal margins tighten, social pressure increases, and international financing becomes scarce?recovery strategies tend to include rapid activation mechanisms, often backed by the loosening of controls.
This pattern has repeated itself through tax amnesties, moratoriums, fiscal pardons, or partial deregulations. However, the case at hand?the attempt to reintegrate so-called ?mattress dollars? into the formal economy through Decree No. 353/2025?presents an unprecedented dilemma: can a liquidity policy justify the retraction of preventive obligations under Law No. 25,246?
This paper seeks to demonstrate that the answer is negative. That the policies for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing (?ML/TF?) have reached such a degree of institutionalization that they are no longer reversible for reasons of temporary convenience. That the role of the FINANCIAL INFORMATION UNIT (?FIU?), the influence of the FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (?FATF?), and Argentina?s regulatory framework in this matter constitute structural limits to any attempt at regulatory evasion.
Empirically, this tension became clearly visible during the first half of 2025. Several specialized media outlets (La Nación, Ámbito Financiero, Infobae, Clarín, El Cronista, among others) reported how the national administration?under intense pressure to rebuild reserves and expand the monetary base without resorting to foreign debt?advanced initiatives aimed at encouraging the circulation of foreign currency informally held by the public.
The proposal, however, sparked a strong technical and political debate. Many experts warned that, without a clear framework for verifying the origin of funds, such measures could severely weaken the country?s anti-corruption legal architecture.
Decree No. 353/2025?presented as part of the so-called ?Historical Reparation Plan for the Savings of Argentines??was interpreted by political and judicial sectors as a disguised money-laundering scheme, lacking parliamentary debate and marked by serious regulatory inconsistencies in light of the existing AML regime.
Moreover, this context was heightened by the upcoming FATF evaluation of Argentina, further exacerbating tensions between fiscal urgency and the need to uphold international standards.
The technical and legal community expressed its concern in outlets such as El Cronista, which published articles analyzing the risks of dismantling the preventive system through unilateral decisions.
Chapter 2: The Informal Economy and the ?Mattress Dollar? Phenomenon
The term ?mattress dollar? refers to the stock of foreign currency savings held outside the formal financial system. In Argentina, it is estimated that this amount ranges between USD 140 billion and USD 170 billion?equivalent to more than three times the Central Bank?s net international reserves as of the end of 2024.
Reports from INDEC, the Central Bank, and private consulting firms agree that approximately 45% of the total dollars held by Argentines are kept outside the banking system. This reality positions the informal economy as one of the largest in the region.
Furthermore, it is estimated that over 60% of Argentine households hold a portion of their assets in physical foreign currency?primarily USD 100 bills?outside the banking system. This pattern stems from structural causes: macroeconomic instability, loss of trust in the banking system (especially following the 2001 crisis), chronic inflation, tax pressure, and currency controls.
From a macroeconomic standpoint, the ?mattress dollar? represents wealth that lacks financial intermediation. Since it is not part of the banking system, it does not generate credit, is not captured by the tax authority, and cannot be used as a countercyclical tool. Moreover, its sudden re-entry into the economy, absent clear rules on traceability or lawful origin, introduces reputational risks and regulatory misalignment.
Attempts to absorb such liquidity without mechanisms for validating the origin of funds could set the country back in its compliance with the 40 FATF Recommendations, particularly those concerning customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, and supervisory effectiveness.
The political drive to capture this surplus liquidity collided with the technical, legal, and institutional framework governing Argentina?s AML/CFT system. This conflict?between fiscal urgency and regulatory integrity?stands at the core of the current financial governance agenda.
According to estimates from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Ministry of Economy, the informal economy exceeds 40% of Argentina?s GDP. The use of foreign currency in real estate, automobile, and commercial transactions is widespread and often lacks effective traceability mechanisms.
This not only poses a challenge for tax control, but also for the AML/CFT system, which is forced to operate in an environment of high opacity.
Chapter 3: The ?Historical Reparation Plan for the Savings of Argentines? and Regulatory Confusion
In May 2025, the National Executive Branch launched the so-called ?Historical Reparation Plan for the Savings of Argentines? through Decree No. 353/2025 (Official Gazette 23/05/2025), whose primary objective was to reintroduce the so-called ?mattress dollars? into the formal economic circuit.
This measure?framed within a series of strategies aimed at mobilizing informal savings and revitalizing the economy?introduced notable changes in the area of fiscal information, including:
a.) Elimination of certain automatic reporting regimes to the tax authority for the purchase and sale of registrable goods such as automobiles and real estate;
b.) Increase in the minimum thresholds for mandatory reporting of financial transactions and transfers to the tax authority;
c.) Creation of a simplified income tax regime for small taxpayers, which does not require exhaustive justification of expenses or asset variations.
Although legitimate from an economic and fiscal policy standpoint, the implementation of these measures caused significant confusion among market actors and legal, economic, and real estate professionals regarding their impact on the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) framework.
As the author explained in a doctrinal publication analyzing the aforementioned decree, the reduction of obligations within the tax information circuit does not in any way imply the repeal or relaxation of the preventive obligations under Law No. 25,246 and its complementary regulations.
The information flows directed to the Financial Information Unit (FIU) serve different interests, obligations, and legal characteristics than those directed to the tax authority.
Obliged Entities?even prior to the FIU issuing a clarification in response to the uncertainties raised by Decree No. 353/2025 through UIF Resolution No. 78/2025 (which will be analyzed in more detail in subsequent chapters of this article)?remained bound to:
a.) Verify the lawful origin of funds;
b.) Construct an adequate transaction profile for each client (based on the origin of funds);
c.) Monitor transactions using a risk-based approach in order to identify and address unusual activity; and
d.) Report suspicious transactions related to money laundering or terrorist financing to the FIU.
These obligations were never altered by the aforementioned decree, which was focused instead on the flow of fiscal information to the Argentine Revenue and Customs Agency (ARCA).
As previously stated, the fiscal information regime applicable to taxpayers or economic actors and the information regime applicable to obliged entities under the FIU are fundamentally different: while the tax regime seeks revenue collection and simplification, the preventive regime aims to protect the financial system and national economic integrity by preventing money laundering and terrorist financing.
Moreover, the confidentiality principle enshrined in Article 22 of Law No. 25,246 has, for decades, prohibited the information collected by Obliged Entities and transmitted to the FIU from being used by other state agencies (such as the AFIP or the new ARCA), except by judicial order in a specific criminal case.
In other words, under the current confidentiality regime governing AML/CFT, there was no need to relax any AML/CFT rules in order to reassure savers holding mattress dollars, since the information obtained through AML/CFT policies is entirely sealed?from the client identification stage carried out by the Obliged Entity, through the monitoring, analysis of unusual activity, and reporting phases, and even after the Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) is filed. The FIU may only analyze such information and submit it to the Public Prosecutor?s Office or a criminal court in the context of a money laundering investigation involving the specific client.
In short, the fiscal measures adopted in Decree No. 353/2025 neither repealed nor modified the requirements of the AML/CFT system, nor did they undermine the technical and operational autonomy of the FIU or of the Obliged Entities in their due diligence processes, even though the Executive Branch instructed the FIU to issue an opinion within 30 days on whether regulatory changes to the AML/CFT framework were necessary.
Chapter 4: Regulatory Persistence and Institutional Reaffirmation of the AML/CFT System
Despite the political context and economic fluctuations, the system for the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing has demonstrated an extraordinary capacity for resilience and regulatory reaffirmation.
Since the establishment of the Financial Information Unit (FIU) in the year 2000?and particularly after the 2011 reform introduced by Law No. 26,683?the Argentine AML/CFT system has undergone a profound transformation, in line with international standards issued by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Latin American Financial Action Task Force (GAFILAT).
In this context, it is worth highlighting several milestones, including the recent enactment of Law No. 27,739 (March 2024), which consolidated a comprehensive reform of Law No. 25,246 by expanding supervisory powers, updating sanctions, and strengthening the FIU; the issuance of specific UIF Resolutions since 2018 that deepened the implementation of the risk-based approach required by FATF and enhanced due diligence obligations in sectors such as real estate, property registries, and financial institutions; and the institutional response to attempts at weakening the system?such as Decree No. 891/2024?which was met with criticism from the technical and legal community in defense of the existing preventive framework.
This is further reinforced by the fact that Argentina, being in the midst of an evaluation process by the FATF, cannot afford to take steps backwards or implement regulatory relaxations without jeopardizing its international status and access to global financial markets.
The AML/CFT system must be consolidated as a cross-cutting State policy, independent of the current administration, and supported by three fundamental pillars: Clear and demanding regulations; Effective and transparent supervision; Proportional and dissuasive sanctions.
As this author has previously stated, ?the system cannot be built upon opportunistic rhetoric or adapted to short-term needs. Its integrity lies in the consistency between the rules, their implementation, and the commitments undertaken by the country.?
Regulatory persistence and institutional reaffirmation of the system are not only guarantees of compliance?they are essential components of Argentina?s international credibility and of the overall integrity of its financial system.
Chapter 5: The Threat of Decree No. 891/2024 and the Institutional Risk to the AML/CFT System
On December 27, 2024, the Official Gazette published Emergency Decree (DNU) No. 891/2024. Article 11 of said decree introduced a substantial amendment to Law No. 25,246 by directly removing certain sensitive sectors?such as customs brokers and automobile dealerships?from the list of Obliged Entities.
The DNU was presented by the Executive Branch as part of a broader economic deregulation package. However, it generated immediate and forceful criticism from technical and academic sectors, due to the following reasons:
a.) Disregard for parliamentary procedure. Just a few months earlier (March 2024), a comprehensive reform of Law No. 25,246 had been passed (Law No. 27,739), the result of broad legislative and technical consensus. That process included extensive discussion of the scope of Obliged Entities, with the participation of GAFILAT, the FIU, and international bodies. It was in that context that a consensus was reached: some actors would be removed from the list (e.g., foundations receiving donations), others would remain (including dealerships and customs brokers), and new actors would be added to Article 20 (such as Virtual Asset Service Providers, Payment Service Providers, attorneys, among others).
b.) Violation of the principle of legality. The DNU amended a formal law that establishes obligations of cooperation in the prevention of criminal offenses (such as money laundering) by decree?something constitutionally impermissible in matters of criminal collaboration.
c.) Weakening of the institutional architecture of the preventive system. The measure removed sectors historically linked to the laundering of illicit assets.
As noted by CASSAGNE Consultores when consulted by El Cronista (4 February 2025), the measure ?turned off the system?s security cameras? in highly exposed sectors. This, despite the fact that Argentina?s 2022 National Risk Assessment (NRA) identified vehicle purchases as one of the top three channels for money laundering in the country, and that customs offenses?such as smuggling?represent 9% of the predicate offenses for money laundering.
It also ignored GAFILAT?s 2021 Regional Typologies Report, which identified the automotive and customs brokerage sectors as among the most exploited by criminal organizations in the region.
The measure was adopted just days before a decisive FATF evaluation, thereby placing the country?s international standing at risk. The executive decision to eliminate preventive oversight in critical sectors was interpreted as a sign of institutional weakening, raising the specter of Argentina?s return to the FATF grey list.
The criticism was not only technical or legal?it was strategic. As previously expressed, the removal of Obliged Entities by decree and without legislative consensus sets a dangerous precedent, one that enables the manipulation of the AML/CFT system for sectoral purposes, opening the door to corporate lobbying and influence.
A credible preventive system cannot depend on the political urgencies of the administration in office. Its strength must be anchored in legal principles and international standards.
Chapter 6: The FIU?s Most Recent Move to Strengthen the Preventive System: Reaffirmation of the Regime and Increase in Sanctions
In contrast to the signals of regulatory relaxation promoted by the Executive Branch?and in response to the confusion and uncertainty generated by Decree No. 353/2025 in the area of anti-money laundering policies?the Financial Information Unit (FIU) carried out, in recent months, a decisive and unexpected action: it reaffirmed the AML/CFT system by refusing to relax the obligations imposed on Obliged Entities, and almost simultaneously increased monetary penalties for non-compliance by 35%. This was achieved through the issuance of two resolutions: UIF Resolution No. 78/2025 and UIF Resolution No. 95/2025.
a.) UIF Resolution No. 78/2025: Reaffirming the System. The FIU?s Response to Decree No. 353/2025: Institutional Firmness in the Face of Relaxation Attempts
As noted, through Decree No. 353/2025, the Executive Branch instructed the Financial Information Unit to issue an opinion within 30 days on the potential need to modify its regulations in light of the decree?s provisions.
This request generated great expectation and uncertainty across various economic sectors, particularly among Obliged Entities, many of whom?due to the widespread confusion spread by media outlets?expected a generalized relaxation of AML/CFT controls, in line with the spirit of the decree, the government?s economic policy, and even public statements by the President of the Nation that suggested, or created the public impression, that the use of ?mattress dollars? would no longer be subject to scrutiny.
However, the FIU?s institutional response was swift and unequivocal in reaffirming the existing compliance framework. Through UIF Resolution No. 78/2025 (Official Gazette 24/04/2025), the FIU not only refrained from weakening the AML/CFT system, but expressly reaffirmed its core structure of obligations. In this regard, the FIU resolved not to modify the general due diligence, transaction monitoring, or suspicious transaction reporting frameworks set forth in the specific resolutions governing each category of Obliged Entity.
The only aspect that was relaxed pertained to the systematic information reporting regime (i.e., regular reports not based on concrete suspicions), and solely with respect to a small subset of Obliged Entities listed under Article 20 of Law No. 25,246?namely: Real Property Registries, Motor Vehicle Registries, Banks and Financial Institutions, and Notaries Public.
Even in these cases, the so-called ?relaxation? was limited to increasing the minimum thresholds for transactions that must be reported systematically to the FIU, thereby exempting transactions below those amounts from the obligation.
Nonetheless, the resolution clearly emphasized that this relaxation in systematic reporting in no way relieves Obliged Entities of their individual due diligence duties, including those relating to transactions below the new reporting thresholds.
Thus, for this small group of Obliged Entities addressed by UIF Resolution No. 78/2025, although they are no longer required to submit automated reports for lower-value transactions, they remain legally obligated to:
a.) Properly identify their clients;
b.) Verify and document the origin and legality of the funds used in the transaction;
c.) Determine the client?s transactional profile (by requesting supporting documentation regarding the origin and legitimacy of funds);
d.) Monitor transactions;
e.) Detect unusual operations; and
f.) Report to the FIU those deemed suspicious.
Following the issuance of this resolution, Obliged Entities that had suspended or postponed their compliance duties while awaiting potential regulatory relaxation were reminded of the necessity to reinforce and fully comply with their AML/CFT policies to ensure effective compliance and avoid the now more severe sanctions regime, as discussed below.
b.) UIF Resolution No. 95/2025: The Final Blow
Following its firm response to the perceived regulatory relaxation campaign in the media, the FIU?continuing its strategy of system strengthening and greater effectiveness?issued, one week later, a second decisive measure reaffirming Argentina?s commitment to its international obligations, particularly those undertaken before the FATF and the international financial community.
Specifically, through UIF Resolution No. 95/2025, the FIU increased the value of the ?penalty unit? from ARS 40,000 to ARS 54,140, representing a 35% increase. As a result, the minimum fine for each formal breach of an AML/CFT obligation (except for Suspicious Transaction Reports) now stands at ARS 812,100, with a maximum of ARS 135,350,000.
Moreover, this amount doubles when the Obliged Entity is a legal person or legal arrangement, as the same fine is imposed both on the entity and its governing body.
This measure falls within the scope of Law No. 25,246 as amended by Law No. 27,739, which authorizes periodic adjustments of the penalty unit value.
Over the past two years, monetary sanctions?used by the FIU as a tool to enhance system effectiveness?have increased significantly: from a maximum of ARS 100,000 per breach (as of March 2024) to current values exceeding ARS 270 million, reflecting a zero-tolerance policy toward non-compliance and seeking to ensure that such sanctions act as a genuine deterrent?convincing Obliged Entities to comply without weighing the cost-benefit ratio of non-compliance.
These two resolutions?Nos. 78/2025 and 95/2025?do not relax the system to encourage informality or reduce control mechanisms for ?mattress dollar? transactions. On the contrary, they confirm the validity and pursuit of an enhanced preventive model, aligned with FATF Recommendations 1, 26, and 35, which require countries to demonstrate effective deterrence capacity, supervisory reach, and meaningful consequences for non-compliance.
Far from relaxing the system, the FIU sent a clear message to the market: the preventive regime remains in force and has been reinforced, regardless of short-term political initiatives.
This institutional stance by Argentina?s top AML/CFT authority reinforces its functional and technical autonomy as the lead agency of the AML/CFT system and strengthens Argentina?s alignment with the FATF, its member countries, and international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Conclusion: Regulatory Governance, International Commitment, and State Policy
The analysis of recent economic and regulatory measures in Argentina reveals a structural tension between short-term liquidity needs and long-term international commitments regarding financial transparency.
On one hand, we see the unilateral actions of the Executive Branch, particularly in the case of Decree No. 891/2024, whose issuance exemplifies how decisions adopted outside parliamentary and technical consensus?and without regard for previously assumed international commitments?can seriously undermine the regulatory framework that took decades to build. The removal of critical sectors from the AML/CFT system, such as dealerships and customs brokers, sets a dangerous institutional precedent and raises significant legal concerns.
bintegrity, legal certainty, and trust. Because without legal certainty, there can be no investment?and without investment, there is no development.
Regulatory maturity, the FIU?s technical consolidation, FATF?s supervisory role, and the awareness of system stakeholders must work in concert to avoid backsliding.
The legitimacy of any preventive system is not measured by what is written in its legal texts, but by its real ability to resist short-term manipulation or sectoral pressure from economic actors seeking to increase profits through regulatory relaxation.
As shown by international experience, dismantling AML/CFT systems always proves to be a costly shortcut?damaging a country?s reputation, market access, judicial cooperation, and overall credibility. For this reason, fortifying the Argentine AML/CFT system is an intergenerational task. An investment in the future. A guarantee of institutional solidity.
? Useful Links for Further Analysis:
Summary of UIF Resolution No. 78/2025:
Summary of UIF Resolution No. 95/2025:
Commentary on Decree No. 353/2025:
Commentary in El Cronista on the adverse effects of Decree No. 891/2024: